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In 1990 the German personal income tax schedule underwent a
major change. We interpret this reform as a ‘natural experiment´
and use a panel of individual income tax returns to analyze the
response of income to changes in the individual tax rates. Our
results suggest an average elasticity of taxable income with re-
spect to the net-of-tax rate of around 0.4. Due to the detailed
information the panel provides, we are not only able to distinguish
between diﬀerent levels of income but also between diﬀerent types
of income. We found very low elasticity estimates in the case of
regular employment income, but values of up to 1.0 for business
income and for high-income households.
JEL classiﬁcation: H24,H31,J29
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Assessing empirically the classical conﬂict between eﬃciency and redistri-
bution requires the quantiﬁcation of behavioral responses to incentives pro-
vided by existing tax systems. With regard to the personal income tax, the
response of taxable income to changes in the individual net-of-tax rate (i.e.
one minus the marginal tax rate) has recently gained considerable attention.
The startling results obtained by Feldstein (1995) – that taxable income de-
clared by U.S. households is extremely sensitive to changes in the individual
net-of-tax rate – along with the implications of this results for optimal tax
policy design (Feldstein 1999) lead to a series of subsequent investigations
sometimes called ‘New Tax Responsiveness Literature´ (Goolsbee, 2000)1.
Although the elasticity estimates found in recent studies are considerably
lower than Feldstein’s (1995) results and vary considerably – the estimates
range from negative values to values of well above 2.0, where, for the U.S.,
the most frequent elasticity estimate seems to be about 0.5 – they clearly
conﬁrm the empirical relevance of this issue for policy issues.
The present paper is a ﬁrst German contribution to the ‘New Tax Responsive-
ness Literature´. We used the German tax reform of 1990 as a quasi-natural
ﬁeld experiment and observed the sensitivity of individual taxable income to
changes in marginal tax rates to derive behavioral elasticity estimates. Some
points are worth to be mentioned. First, compared to tax reforms which
served as natural experiments in similar studies the German reform consid-
ered here provided some interesting, if not unique characteristics. Since most
countries use a system of tax rate bands, a reduction of the tax rate in one
band aﬀects all households in this particular income bracket in the same way.
As a consequence, the variation of one of the main variables which determine
household behavior under taxation is rather limited. Due to the particular
structure of the German income tax schedule (before and after the reform) in
combination with the diﬀerent tax treatment of singles and married couples,
households with rather equal levels of income were aﬀected by quite diﬀerent
changes in their marginal tax rates whereas, at the same time, households
with quite diﬀerent levels of income were hit by the same change of the tax
price. Second, in many of the investigated reforms as, for example, the US
Tax Reform Act of 1986 which underlied a whole series of studies (see, for
example, Feldstein (1995), Auten/Carroll (1999), Moﬃtt/Wilhelm (2000)),
the top maginal tax rates underwent the largest cuts. In this light the found
elasticity estimates could be driven, to a large extend, by the reaction of high
income households only. In the German tax reform the highest cuts of the
marginal tax rates arose for mid range taxable income.
Furthermore, the data we used enabled us to replicate the tax assesment of
1For a brief summary see, for example, Aarbu/Thorensen (2001) or, more recently,
Gruber/Saez (2002).
1every indivudual taxﬁler. We were also in a position to carry out hypothet-
ical tax assesments with all reform measures taken into account assuming
unchanged (pre-reform) household behavior. In doing so we are able to dis-
tinguish between tax price eﬀects and tax base, respectively income eﬀects
in a manner very similar to that used by Gruber/Saez (2002).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we sketch the main features
of the German tax reform. This section is followed by a short description of
the data set underlying the estimation. The estimation equation is derived
in section 4, followed by a discussion of the estimation strategy in section
5. Section 6 presents our estimation results. A short summary of the main
results combined with some concluding remarks end the paper.
2 The German tax reform of 1990
The centerpiece of the 1990 tax reform was undoubtedly the replacement of
the income tax schedule. Due to political concern about large disincentive
eﬀects, especially for mid-income earners, the pre-reform schedule which –
in terms of marginal tax rates – increased concavely in taxable income was
replaced by a linearly increasing schedule. The replacement also entailed a
general reduction of the marginal tax rates. At the bottom of the scale tax
rates were cut from 0.22 to 0.19, and from 0.56 to 0.53 at the top of the tax
scale . Furthermore, the guaranteed minimum income was raised by roughly
850 DM to 5617 DM. Pre-reform and post-reform schedules are scetched in
Figure 1.
As can be seen quite clearly from Figure refﬁg:tarif diﬀerent levels of taxable
income were aﬀected quite diﬀerently by the reduction of the marginal tax
rates. The reduction of marginal tax rates translates into respective increases
of the net-of-tax rates. The net-of-tax rate is deﬁned as one minus the
marginal tax rate and can be viewed as a measure for the incentives provided
by the tax system to consume tax-favoured goods – that is, to declare less
taxable income by resorting to activities which are deductible or excluded
from the tax base. For any given level of taxable income the change in the
net-of-tax rate caused by the reform can easily be depicted from Figure 1
as the vertical distance between τ88 and τ90
2. Due to the adjustment of the
guaranteed minimum income taxﬁlers with a taxable income near the bottom
of the tax schedule experienced the largest increase in their net-of-tax rate
(about 28 percent). Beside this base eﬀect, individuals with a taxable income
of around 60000 DM beneﬁted the most by the reform (with peak values of
around 19 percent). As for individuals with very low or very high levels of
taxable income the change in their net-of-tax rate amounted to only 4 or 7
percent, respectively. Within this respect the German tax reform diﬀers from
2Since (1 − τ90) − (1 − τ88)=τ88 − τ90.
2Figure 1: Marginal tax rates on taxable income before and after the reform.
most of the other tax reforms carried out in OECD-countries over the last
two decades. In all these reforms the largest tax cuts applied to high-income
households.
Simultaneuosly, a considerable number of other reform measures were in-
truduced which primarily entailed only tax base eﬀects. Among these were
the abolition of the allowance for professional earnings, the abolition of the
allowance for persons older than 64 years, the increase of the allowance for
single parents and the increase of the allowance for professional expenses
granted to non-itemizers, just to name a few3. As a consequence, not neces-
sarily everybody gained by the reform. However, the reform was intended to
reduce the tax burden and the vast majority of households actually experi-
enced a tax relief. If one formally applies all reform measures on, for example,
the 1989 data of our dataset in a static manner – i.e., without taking any
behavioral changes into account – only 2 percent of all the taxﬁlers in the
dataset would face a rising tax liability. Oﬃcial estimates speciﬁed the total
tax relief to amount to about 33 billion DM (BMF (1989)).
3The complete list comprises no less than 62 items. (BMF (1989))
33 The data
Our study is based on the income tax panel of the ‘Institut fuer Angewandte
Wirtschaftsforschung´ (IAW). This panel dataset consists of consecutive in-
dividual and joint income tax assesments of 34555 households covering the
period 1988-91. It constitutes a representative sample of all income tax cases
of Baden-Wuerttemberg. With more than 150 entries for every single tax
case the data is very detailed concerning tax relevant information. It even
allows the detailed replication of the income tax assessment on the individual
level. Additional demographic information, however, is rather limited due to
conﬁdentiality reasons. On the other hand, not only income from dependent
work is recorded in the dataset, but other types of income as well. Hence,
we can also investigate the responsiveness of households who run a business,
receive property income, etc. Figure 2 shows the percentage share of taxﬁlers
who report to have income of the listed types in 1988. Note that households
declaring income from agriculture and ﬁshery are excluded from the ﬁgure
just as from the whole investigation, since these sectors are heavily regulated
and the respective income also depends strongly on external factors such as
subsidies, weather conditions, pests and the like. These circumstances make
it hard, if not impossible, to extract those behavioral reactions which can be
attributed to the tax reform.
Our investigation is based on the comparison of taxable income declared be-
fore (1988) and after (1990) the reform. Since the reform took place only in
1990 this time span may seem a bit short, speciﬁcally, if individuals respond
slowly to tax changes4. On the other hand, in mid 1991 several special settle-
ments were introduced into the German income tax law with the intention to
speed up and to help ﬁnancing the East German economic recovery5.T h e s e
measures cannot be seen as an integral part of the 1990 reform which serves
as the ‘natural experiment’ in our study. On the contrary, the general inte-
nion of the 1990 reform was mostly reversed by these measures. Comparing
1988 to 1991 outcomes would include the eﬀects of this program and would
thus interfere with the eﬀects of the 1990 reform. Futhermore, the tax reform
act of 1990 was passed in mid 88. Hence, the change in the income tax was
well known in advance.
In order to avoid the inclusion of changes of the taxable income which we
consider not to be directly attributable to the tax reform we excluded those
cases from our investigation for which one of the following events applied:
4See Goolsbee (2000) or Weiner (1997) for a further discussion of the time length
considered.
5Among the introduced measures were, for example, a surcharge on the income tax
commonly referred to as the ’solidarity tax contribution’, subsidies and accelerated depre-
ciation allowances for capital invested in East Germany.
4Figure 2: Share of individuals who declare income of the respective type to
total number of individuals (in percent) cut in deciles.
• the individual retired during the regarded period,
• the marital status of the individual changed,
• the number of children changed in unison with the labor force partici-
pation of the respective individual,
• the individual received social security beneﬁts such as unemployment
beneﬁts or sick beneﬁts.
This strategy is, of course, disputable. Especially concerning the ﬁrst and
the third item on the list above. Most studies exclude all retired individuals
in general. In our case this seemed inappropriate. Clearly, if a person retired
during the regarded period he, or she, probably experienced a signiﬁcant cut
in gross income, depending on the respective pension scheme. This eﬀect
is no behavioral response on the reform and should therefore be excluded.
If, however, individuals retired before 1990 the respective data may well
reﬂect a reaction on the reform. In particular, since about 85 percent of all
retirees in the dataset report to have income from additional sources and also
5pay income tax. However, as will be seen in section 6, we also performed
estimations without any retirees included as well as estimations solely on
retirees and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the results.
Concerning the third item, we excluded all households who conceived their
ﬁrst child during 1988-90 since we consider this to have a profound impact on
household behavior. If the household already had children we excluded only
those cases for which the number of children in the household increased and
the secondary earner stopped working, or vice versa, the claimed number of
allowances for children decreased and the secondary earner started to work.
After the exclusion of the relevant cases 29705 tax ﬁles remained for the
estimation.
In addition, we held capital income on a constant post-reform level (that of
1990). In other words, we neutralized any household reaction as far as the
declaration of capital income is concerned. The reason for doing so is the
introduction of a source tax on captal income in mid 1989 which was collected
at the banking sector with the intention to reduce tax evasion. Although
this source tax could be oﬀset against the personal income tax liability it
initiated a massive capital ﬂight into foreign investment. As a result, the tax
was already suspended at the end of 1989. Since the consequences of this
short epsode have no eﬀect on the main independent variables, we are unable
to separate household responses to this change of the type of tax collection
from responses of capital income to the 1990 tax reform.
4 The estimation equation
As pointed out in section 2 the tax reform caused substitution as well was
income eﬀects. Therefore, we basically adopted the approach of Gruber/Saez
(2002) with the diﬀerence that we estimated compensated price and income
elasticities. Our starting point is the linearized form of the households budget
equation in the consumption-income model:
(C)=Y − T(TI)=( 1− τ)TI + R (1)
where Y equals gross income, TI is taxable income, and T, τ and R are the
income tax liability, the marginal tax rate and virtual income, respectively.
Virtual income reﬂects the diﬀerence between gross income and taxable in-
come on the one hand and the diﬀerence between T(TI)a n dτTI on the
other. For any household a change in the income tax can thus be decom-
posed into a change of the relevant marginal tax rate τ and a change of virtual
income R. Since the former aﬀects the relative price of tax preferred to or-
dinary consumption and the latter aﬀects the household’s income situation


























The substitution or compensated price elasticity  c and the income elasticity



















respectively. After rearranging the terms of equation (3) and substituting




c d(1 − τ)
(1 − τ)
+  
y d(1 − τ)TI +d R
R
. (5)
From equation (1) can be seen that the initial impact of the tax change on the
household’s income situation is −dT =d ( 1 −τ)TI+dR. As mentioned above,
virtual income captures the diﬀerence between gross income and taxable
income and the approximation error of the linearized tax schedule, i. e.:R =








(Y − TI)+( τTI − T)
. (6)
All terms can be calculated readily from the given data, except for gross
income Y . The latter is approximated by the income ˜ Y reported by the tax-
ﬁler before any allowances and deductions are being applied. Furthermore,
following the majority of all studies in that ﬁeld we used logarithmic approx-
imations for the respective growth rates (dx/x ≈ log(x90/x88)w i t hx88 and
x90 refering to the pre-reform and post-reform situation.).









y T88 − T90
(˜ Y88 − TI 88)+( τ88TI 88 − T88)
+l o gTI 88 + X + µ (7)
where X is a set of additional, mostly dummy variables which will be de-
scribed in the next section and µ symbolizes the error term.
75 Estimation strategy
Three further aspects complicate the estimation. First, due to the functional
relationship between taxable income and the marginal tax rate a straight-
forward OLS regression on the basis of the actual 1988/90 tax rates and
the respective levels of taxable income would be severely biased. As can be
depicted from Figure 1, an increase in the growth rate of taxable income im-
plies, up to a certain point, a decrease in the growth rate of (1−τ)a n dv i c e
versa. Second, via the increase or cut of allowances the tax reform itself im-
plied a change in the size of taxable income even if there were no behavioral
responses. And third, the inﬂuence of inﬂation, business cycles and other
external growth factors should be neutralized.
To account for these factors we proceeded as follows. We inﬂated the 1988
data to correspond to 1990 levels using nominal growth rates. For most of the
items listed in the dataset we derived speciﬁc average growth rates directly
from the dataset itself using the respective 1988 and 1989 ﬁgures. Otherwise,
we used growth rates from oﬃcial sources6. This procedure has its advantages
but also its disadvantages. On the one hand, using previous year growth rates
instead of longer run growth rates is susceptible to exceptional changes such
as exogenous shocks, etc. On the other hand, speciﬁc growth rates are less
crude since regional as well as structural factors are appropriately accounted
for.
On the grounds of the adjusted 1988 data two tax assesments were carried
out by the use of a previosly developed simulation model7. One assesment
was based on pre-reform tax rules and computed the taxable income levels
TI
pre
88 , the net-of-tax rates (1 − τ
pre
88 ) and the tax liabililties T
pre
88 , the other










88 is deprived from formal redeﬁnitions of the tax base caused
b yt h er e f o r mw eu s e dl o g ( TI 90/TI
post
88 ) as dependent variable. Concerning
the independent variables we speciﬁed two alternatives. In the ﬁrst alter-
native we took log
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of the reform – as instruments to account for the interdependencies of tax



























dent variables. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation entailed an IV-regression, the second
speciﬁcation was used for a median regression. We chose a median regres-
6For example, professional expenses were updated with the inﬂation rate listed in the
Statistical Yearbook (StBa, 2000)
7The model applies the income tax code on the individual and joint taxﬁlers and
computes all tax relevant information.
8sion because the estimates are less inﬂuenced by outliers which are bound to
occur in investigations of this type.
6 Estimation results
Before we turn to the estmation results, Table 1 lists the aggregate growth
rates of taxable income by income deciles. Obviously, the growth rates of
the lowest two deciles show the highest increase in taxable income. Very
likely, this can be contributed to life-cycle and reversion-to-the-mean eﬀects.
Unfortunately we do not have any explicit information about the individuals
age. However, the high concentration of singles in the lowest two deciles –
50-60 percent in the lower deciles compared to around 10-25 percent in higher
ones – seems to support this interpretation.
Table 1: Taxable income per capita and average marginal tax rate in 1988,
aggregate change of taxable income 1988-1990, in deciles. Individuals ranked












1 8070 30.06 15.37
2 16403 17.68 21.42
3 24446 9.86 24.49
4 30661 5.19 26.94
5 36516 5.01 28.11
6 43441 4.00 29.49
7 51489 4.69 30.81
8 61073 2.87 33.00
9 76037 2.50 36.46
10 179676 5.37 46.04
On the other hand, the aggregate change of the net-of-tax rate is also com-
parably large, at least for the lowest income decile. This is, in part, a con-
sequence of the raise of the guaranteed minimum income which generated
the highest observed change in the net-of-tax rate. Furthermore, Figure 2 on
page 5 reveals that the percentage of individuals reporting to have regular
employment income is well below average, whereas the proportionate share
of individuals reporting income from self-employment, business income or
rental income is comparably large and declining for subsequent deciles8.I f
8Note that old age pensioners were excluded from the data presented in Table 1 and in
9promotion of the typically younger individuals, which usually leads to a con-
siderable raise in their salary, were the only cause of the observed high growth
rates, one would expect the share of individuals earning capital income or
rental income to be quite low. However, this is not the case. Taking also into
account that, according to the German tax law, the means to take inﬂuence
on the tax base are more limited as far as income from regular employment
is concerned than for other types of income – taxable rental income, for ex-
ample, is in the majority of all cases a negative ﬁgure – there is also mild
evidence that households in these groups have a stronger preference to avoid
taxes. In this case, the comparably strong reaction of taxable income might
also be caused by short run eﬀects such as income shifting in time, at least
to some extend.
Although it cannot be ruled out beforehand that highly ”tax sensitive” house-
holds are concentrated in the lowest income deciles we restrict our regressions
to households (or individuals) with a taxable income of 10000 DM or higher,
due to the previous argumentation9. This sum amounts to approximately
twice of the guaranteed minimum income in the base year.
6.1 All Households
The ﬁrst series of regressions is performed on all relevant households or indi-
viduals regardless of the type of income they earn and regardless of the in-
come level. Table 2 shows the estimation results of four diﬀerent estimation
speciﬁcations. Columns I and II refer to instrumental variable regressions
which are most commonly applied. The instruments are chosen as explained
in Section 4. The only diﬀerence between regressions I and II is that in II
lny is included as control variable for reversion-to-the-mean eﬀects.
It should be noted that, on the individual level, the observed proportionate
change of taxable income ranges from −7.25 to 12.5. Obviously, an increase
of taxable income by factor 12 is not (solely) contributable to the tax re-
form. However, imposing any limits on the growth rate of taxable income
and thereby restricting the investigation to a certain range would inevitably
be arbitrary. Instead, we contrast the iv-regressions to median regressions
(columns III and IV), since the latter regression method puts less weight on
outliers. Again, the diﬀerence between columns III and IV stemms from the
inclusion of a control for reversion-to-the-mean eﬀects.
As table 2 shows, the inclusion of the control variable leads to higher es-
timates of the compensated substitution elasticity,  c,i nb o t ht y p e so fr e -
Figure 2, because including them would distort the present view. In most of the regressions,
however, the pensioners are included, since about 85 percent of them earn income from
additional sources.
9Although this practice might be problematic it is commonly applied
10Table 2: Elasticity estimates for alternative regression speciﬁcations (All
regressions are unweighted, error probabilities are given in brackets).
Two-Stage-Least-Square Median regression
I II III IV
 c 0.025 0.581 0.246 0.379
(0.832) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 y 0.032 −0.001 −0.650 −0.264
(0.410) (0.909) 0.000 (0.000)
lny −0.134 −0.099
(0.000) (0.000)
Taxable income −0.046 0.042 0.005 0.038
> 70000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000)
Joint ﬁlers 0.030 0.070 −0.012 0.025
(0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Non dependent −0.009 −0.002 0.003 0.010
income (0.335) (0.772) (0.299) (0.000)
No. children 0.023 0.023 0.004 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Single parent −0.013 −0.023 −0.043 −0.036
(0.499) (0.252) (0.000) (0.000)
Handicapped −0.100 −0.114 −0.047 −0.048
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Change in type −0.279 −0.291 −0.061 −0.063
of income (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Older than 64 −0.072 −0.101 −0.065 −0.077
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.018 1.372 0.123 1.102
(0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 28177 28177 28177 28177
11gression. Although the impact is less dramatic in the case of the median
regression (0.246 to 0.379). The iv-estimate of  c is insigniﬁcant without
controlling for mean reversion eﬀects.
Income elasticity estimates range from −0.65 to 0.032. Both iv-estimates of
 y are comparably small and insigniﬁcant. Similar results lead Gruber/Saez
(2002) to the conclusion that income eﬀects do not matter. The median re-
gression estimates, however, do not support this conclusion. Although adding
the controll for reversion-to-the mean reduces the estimate of  y in absolute
terms it is still highly signiﬁcant and of considerable size (−0.264). The nega-
tive sign of the coeﬃcient supports the traditional view of the consumption-
leisure-choice model that an (exogenous) increase in income leads to a re-
duction of taxable income10. The total reaction of the household on the
tax reform thus depends on the relative magnitude of the income and price
change by which the household is aﬀected.
Table 2 also shows the estimation results for the set of additional explanatory
variables – mainly dummy variables – we used for all estimations. Although
we do not list them explicitely in subsequent tables. Based on the idea that
wealthier households save more and consequently receive more income in
later years we included a dummy for households with a taxable income of
above 70000 DM in the base year. As, for example, column IV indicates,
the growth rate of taxable income of this group is indeed higher than for
other households. However, if one takes the mechanism of the control for
reversion-to-the-mean into account and looks at the estimates without the
controll included, the diﬀerence seems to be neglectable.
We also included included a dummy variable for joint ﬁling since the tax
treatment of joint ﬁlers diﬀers from that of individuals. At comparable levels
of taxable income joint ﬁlers generally face a lower tax liability and also a
lower marginal tax rate than individuals. Among other things this preveren-
tial tax treatment itself is a motive to opt for joint ﬁling if income increases
considerably and the estimated coeﬃcient supports this view mildly. As
the coeﬃcient of the dummy for non dependent income shows there is no
evidence that the taxable income of households who declare other types of
income than regular employment income grows faster. In most cases the
estimated coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant.
Perhaps more surprising is the esimation result for the impact of children.
Due to the additional time constraint which parents face, one would expect
the coeﬃcient to have a negative sign. The parents’ opportunities to improve
on their working skills or even their eﬀort at work might be reduced. However,
this is only the case for single parents. Presumably, the time management
within the household (or external ressources) seems to prevent negative ef-
fects. The slightly positive estimations might be a mere statistical eﬀect.
10Although theoretically this must not necessarily be the case.
12Since having children entails considerable allowances idential increases of in-
come in absolute terms are related to a smaller base resulting in larger growth
rates if the number of children is larger.
The coeﬃcients of the other dummies show the expected sign. A change in
the type of income occurs, for example, if the respective individual starts to
operate a business or switches from regular employment to self-employment
during the period under observation. Very likely, such changes come along
with reduced income for a certain (start-up) period, in particular taxable
income, if one takes tax breaks or the accumulation of reserves into account.
Both, handicapped individuals as well as individuals over 64 years of age
are restricted in their job opportunities – although in quite diﬀerent ways –
which explains the negative coeﬃcients. Note however, that the growth rate
of taxable income of the latter group is probably inﬂuenced by the growth
rate of statutory pension payments and by life-cycle eﬀfects. This may also
aﬀect the estimated tax responsivenes11. An additional regression performed
solely on elderly individuals yields a tax-price elasticity of 0.394. If, on the
other hand, one excludes this group from the observation set the estimated
coeﬃecients do not change considerably. The elasticities listed in table 2 fall
from 0.379 to 0.361 ( c)and from −0.099 to −0.113 ( y).
6.2 Households Grouped by the Level of Income
The next table reports the estimation results for particular subgroups of
households. In table 3 households are grouped by taxable income in the
base year. In addition to the responsivenes of taxable income we also used
broader income deﬁnitions for the dependent variable to gain some insights
in the type of responsivenes.
The broadest income deﬁnition used is raw income. This term is equal to
the income declared by the taxﬁlers before any deductions are made and is
thus closest to gross income in an economical sense. Note, however, that
in the case of non dependent income the determination of raw income is
preceded by a proﬁt and loss statement which gives the respective taxﬁlers
more controll over the size of raw income as well as over the timing of in-
come. The second deﬁnition, let us call it total income, equals raw income
net of deductable professional expenses and/or net of some basic variable
and nonvariable allowances related to particular income types12.A l l o t h e r
deductions are captured by taxable income.
11Although the vast majority of individuals in the dataset who are above 64 obtain
additional income from other sources than merely pension payments.
12According to 1988 tax rules 5 % of professional earnings are deductible from the tax
base unless deductions do not exceed 1200 DM, regular employed non itemizers receive a
ﬁxed allowance of 564 DM for professional expenses.
13Table 3: Elasticity estimates for speciﬁc ranges of taxable income and for
speciﬁc deﬁnitions of income (Error probabilities are given in brackets).
Income Taxable income Total income Raw income No.
range  c  y  c  y  c  y Obs.
Iv estimates:
¡ 35000 1.480 −1.770 0.519 −0.433 0.342 −0.003 9488
(0.008) (0.067) (0.029) (0.044) (0.128) (0.329)
35000 - 0.282 −0.367 0.639 −0.028 0.217 0.075 12122
70000 (0.045) (0.000) ( 0.588) (0.833) (0.844) (0.494)
¿ 70000 1.042 0.008 0.882 −0.001 0.845 −0.001 6541
(0.029) (0.569) (0.039) (0.892) (0.026) (0.759)
Median regression estimates:
¡ 35000 0.456 −0.859 0.134 −0.003 0.065 −0.237 9503
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.947) (0.088) (0.000)
35000 - 0.327 −0.445 0.278 0.077 0.207 0.020 12227
70000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.286) (0.045) (0.397) (0.266)
¿ 70000 0.364 −0.226 0.208 −0.061 0.255 −0.192 6539
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Note that although only the estimated elasticity values are listed in the ta-
ble, the estimations were carried out with the full set of regression variables.
Looking at table 3 the following tendencies can be observed. As before, iv-
regressions produce considerably higher estimates for the substitution elas-
ticities and (in absolute terms) lower income elasticity estimates, which are
frequently insigniﬁcant. Second, the broader income is deﬁned the smaller
are the estimated substitution elasticities. This may in part be contributed
to a statistical eﬀect since the income variations are related to a larger base.
And third, estimates of  c are higher in the low and in the high income seg-
ment than for mid range income. It should be mentioned that despite the fact
that we controll for reversion to the mean and life cycle eﬀects, especially the
etimates for the low income range may still be biased upwards due to a very
pronounced impact of these eﬀects within this group. However, if raw income
is used as dependent variable the respective elasticity estimate is rather low.
It amounts to 0.065 in the median regression case. Taking furthermore into
account that within this group raw income is - in average - 1.6 times larger
than taxable income, then the estimate would translate into an elasticity of
taxable income of around 0.1 if variation of raw income were the only house-
hold reaction to the change of tax rates. Since we acually found an estimate
of 0.456 for taxable income, there is again some evidence that households
within this group are quite tax sensitive and that variation of raw income
14seems not to be the dominant element of the household’s responsivenes.
Only for households of the high income range the reform-induced increase
of net-of-tax rates has a considerable and highly signiﬁcant impact on raw
income. The other groups seem to react mainly by adjusting tax privileged
activities/consumption.
6.3 Grouping by types of income
There are basically two ways to investigate whether the tax responsiveness
also depends on the type of income. The ﬁrst alternative is to look exclusively
at the variations of the type of income in question. This means that a
broader income deﬁnition must be used since the majority of deductions
or allowances are not directly contributable to a particular income source.
Hence only a part of an individuals means to reduce the tax burden enter the
investigation. Furthermore, an individuals total income is often comprised
of various diﬀerent income types and the responsivenes of the type of income
in question may well be inﬂuenced by the total income situation and by the
particular composition of total income13.
The second alternative leaves the focus on the taxable income of the individ-
ual or household. Here, households are grouped according to whether they
receive a particular type of income or not. In contrast to the ﬁrst alternative
the grouping is exclusive, i. e. if a household is allocated to the business in-
come group it will not occur in any other group even though most households
of that group also earn income from regular employment14. This approach
captures all legal means to reduce the tax burden. However, the observed
reaction of taxable income may be partly stemming from other sources of
income than the one in question. Since rental income is in very few cases
the major source of income no seperate group has been considered for this
income type.
Both alternatives have their drawbacks but also allow for insights from dif-
ferent perspectives. The estimation results are given in tables 5 and 4. As
before, only elasticity estimates are listed in the tables.
The upper half of Table 4 refers to estimates over the whole range of income
(TI > 10000). Not surprisingly, the income types allowing for a more ‘cre-
ative’ declaration of income also yield higher estimates for the compensated
price elasticity  c whereas the elasticity of the least ﬂexible type of income
within this respect – namely income from regular employment – is much
lower (0.139). The estimate for rental income, however, should be treated
with caution. As already mentioned, real property is a tax preferred asset
13Think, for example, of the decision whether to invest in real property or hold purely
ﬁnancial assets, especially in the light of the diﬀerent tax treatment of both types.
14Which in most cases means employment at their own ﬁrm.
15Table 4: Elasticities for diﬀerent types of raw income ˜ Yi (˜ Yi > 0, median
regression estimates)
business self-employed rental regular employed
TI > 10000
 c 0.296 0.319 0.295 0.139
(0.059) (0.275) (0.007) (0.000)
 y 0.437 0.018 0.016 0.319
(0.000) (0.010) (0.478) (0.000)
No. Obs. 4036 1619 3621 26083
TI > 100000
 c 1.005 0.947 0.693 0.171
(0.043) (0.018) (0.523) (0.085)
 y −0.002 0.019 −0.010 −0.084
(0.000) (0.000) (0.801) (0.008)
No. Obs. 758 554 377 2062
and rental income is in 5137 out of 8758 relevant cases negative. Since, for
obvious reasons, negative values are excluded from the regression, the es-
timate is based on only 40% of all taxﬁlers who declared to receive rental
income. Furthermore, the observation period we chose for our investigation
might be considered as too short to capture the full eﬀect of the reform on
this income type.
The lower half of Table 4 lists the estimation results for high income earn-
ers. More precisely, the regressions are restricted to households with at least
100000 DM of taxable income. With the exception of income from regular
employment, the estimates of the compensated price elasticities are consid-
erably higher for this group of households and income elasticities seem to be,
in tendency, less important. The results suggest that high income earners
tend to respond more pronounced with the adjustment of raw income to a
change of the marginal tax rate than the average household. In the case of
rental income, however, the variance of the error term rises sharply leading
to a very poor level of signiﬁcance (0.523). Since high tax rates provide a
strong incentive to avoid taxes the high variance might again indicate that
rental income adapts more slowly to a new situation while some households
exploited their means to shift income in time. As far as income from regular
employment is concerned only a slight increase of the estimated price elas-
ticity can be observed. The rather low estimates seem to be in line with a
16Table 5: Elasticities for households grouped by income type (median regres-
sion estimates)
business self-employed regular employed
TI > 10000
 c 0.595 −0.187 0.363
(0.000) (0.177) (0.000)
 y 0.655 −0.306 −0.529
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000)
No. Obs. 5240 1917 16706
TI > 100000
 c 0.999 0.647 0.615
(0.002) (0.005) (0.035)
 y 0.145 0.041 −0.694
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. Obs. 908 517 1117
number of labor supply estimations15.
The results shown in Table 5 are based on the responsiveness of taxable in-
come rather than raw income. In contrast to the results listed in Table 4 all
means of a taxﬁler to inﬂuence the tax base now leave their mark, except for
pure substitution eﬀects between diﬀerent types of income. Consequently,
this approach stresses the reaction of the individual (respectively the house-
hold) as deceiding unit rather than the reaction of a particular income type.
Note that the grouping of households is now exclusive although somewhat
arbitrary16.
In general, the picture that can be drawn from Table 5 resembles that of
Table 4. Again, the price elasticity estimates for high income households
are distinctly higher than the average estimates obtained over the whole in-
come range. The price elasticity estimate for regular employed - high income
households (0.615) is now almost twice as high than the respective average
estimate (0.363). Apparently, households earning mainly income from reg-
ular employment exploit predominantly other means to respond to tax rate
changes than with the adjustment of their main source of income. In this
context it should be noted that even in the case of regular employment the
taxable income of a household typically comprises other types of income too.
15See, for example, Killingsworth (1983)
16All households declaring business income make up the ﬁrst group, households who
declare self-employed income and who are not already in the ﬁrst group make up the
second, etc.
17For example, 33% of all households of this group also declare rental income
and 39% declare capital income. For the high income group these ﬁgures rise
to about 51% and 49%, respectively (in both cases the declared amount of
rental income is, in aggregate, negative).
For similar reasons the average estimates listed in the upper half of Table 5
are in tendency higher than in the previous approach. Concerning the income
elasticity estimates no obvious pattern can be found.
7 Summary and conclusions
We estimated the response of taxable income to changes in the marginal
net-of-tax rate, where the German tax reform of 1990 served as a natural
experiment. Since the reform combined a change of the income tax sched-
ule with a number of modiﬁcations of speciﬁc deductions and allowances we
followed the approach of Gruber/Saez (2002) to seperate price-eﬀects from
income-eﬀects. We found average elasticity estimates, based on all house-
holds, ranging from 0.38, in the case of a median regression approach, to
0.58, in the case of an IV-regression approach, most commonly used in this
area. The signiﬁcant discrepancy in the estimates of the two approaches is
due to stronger responses in the low as well as in the high income section.
Both have a stronger impact on the result of the iv-regression.
If we restrict the regression to speciﬁc ranges of income, we found higher
estimates for the low as well as for the high income range. A greater sen-
sitivity of high income households is not too surprising. Since the marginal
tax rates are considerably higher for this group, they are very likely more
tax-aware than other households. The high estimates for the low income
range, on the other hand, could be due to life-cycle eﬀects which cause an
upward bias. However, if we use a broader income deﬁnition and compare
the estimation results with the respective estimate for taxable income, life
cycle eﬀects do not seem to be the cause for tis outcome. A second reason
for these somewhat peculiar results could be the particular structure of the
German tax schedule. At both edges of the schedule the marginal tax rates
are constant over a certain range, whereas in between the taxes rates are
linearly increasing in income. Hence, an increase in taxable income leads
inevitably to an increasing marginal tax rate for households with mid range
income. As pointed out by Sillamaa (1999), household reactions might be
dampened by this eﬀect.
Concerning the responsivenes of diﬀerent types of income we obtained es-
timates of around 0.3 for business, self-employed, and rental income and a
value of 0.139 for labour income. The letter is surprisingly in line with respec-
tive estimates of labour-supply elasticities and does not change signiﬁcantly
if we restrict the regression to high income households only. The estimates
18for other income types, however raise considerably to values of up to 1.005.
On the one hand, these results conﬁrm the intuitive notion that the extend
to which the realization of income can be inﬂuenced by the taxﬁler, e.g. via
timing of income, plays a crucial role. On the other hand, the opportunities
provided by the tax code are exploited more intensely by richer households.
The estimated elasticities reﬂect both, behavioral patterns as well as insti-
tutional ones. Since the letter are usually modiﬁed by the investigated tax
reform itself (in addition to a mere change of the tax schedule), one should
be cautious with comparisons of elasticity estimates obtained from diﬀerent
studies as well as with straightforward applications of the results, e.g. when
predicting the eﬀets of planned tax reforms17. To take the narrowing or
widening of the inﬂuence capabilities provided by the tax code more appro-
priately into account seems to be an interesting ﬁeld for future research.
Nevertheless, the results we found suggest a considerable tax price response
– especially, as far as income not stemming from regular employment and/or
high income households are concerned – which should not be neglected in
discussions of future income tax modiﬁcations.
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